Legal Duty and Judicial Style: The Meaning of Precedent by Deutsch, Jan Ginter
HeinOnline -- 25 St. Louis U. L.J. 87 1981-1982
LEGAL DUTY AND JUDICIAL STYLE:
THE MEANING OF PRECEDENT
J. G. DEUTSCH·
M. H. HOEFLICH··
Senator Roman Hruska defended Nixon's nomination of G.
Harold Carswell by saying that mediocrity was entitled to representa-
tion on the Supreme Court. I It was a remarkable statement, and the
memory that Hruska made it indicates we shared his view that
something was awry with the Warren Court's readings of the law.
What we cannot recall (if indeed we ever knew it) is the argument
Hruska made in support of his position: "We can't have all
Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that. I
doubt we can. I doubt we want to."2
"Stuff like that" is not something of which Hruska approves, and
it must therefore be distinguishable from mediocrity, which Hruska
argues should be represented on the Court. The basis on which
mediocrity deserves representation is presumably that the law should
reflect the society it is designed to govern. The implied contrast with
"stuff like that," therefore, is distance from the law, a separation be-
tween Justices and the society for which they make law, a separation that
permits the law to reflect the Court's view of what ought to be. 3
Law as a system that dictates the content of what ought to be,
law that imposes itself on the judge, is the perception explicitly ar-
ticulated by Justice Holmes. As is typical of Holmes' style, what is
compelling is the graphic nature of the image in terms of which he
expresses this perception of the judge as performing solely a
ministerial function. Once the legislature has made a decision, argued
Holmes, what a court should do is to enforce "the very meaning of a
line in the law . . . that you intentionally may go as close to it as you
can if you do not pass it."4 Like all graphic images, this vision of
law as a clear line is at bottom an instructive simplificl:'ltion.
Holmes' perception of law can provide a justification for stop-
ping obstruction of New Deal social experimentation, but it is not a
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1. C. EINSTEIN, WILLIE'S TIME 279 (1979).
2. This statement was made by Senator Hruska in the course of a television
interview. [d.
3. See Hoeflich & Deutsch, Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749 (1978).
4. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395 (1929).
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view that is often expressed by those seeking to evoke respect for the
law. In most controversies submitted to the judiciary, the judge must
confront the possibility that the governing norms are either uncertain
or overlap. In so doing, the judge is aware of his role as one requir-
ing the creation of new rules on the peripheries of legislation. A
rulemaking bureaucracy able, on a current basis, continually to fill
the interstices left by legislative efforts simply shifts the law creative
function to itself away from the judge.
What is troublesome about such a solution is not the expense
(though maintenance of such a bureaucracy is not cheap), as much as
the substitution of administrative fiat for judicial discretion. It is
clear, therefore, that the contrast underlying the Hruska statement is
at best applicable only to those situations not susceptible to ad-
ministrative regulation; cases where a judge or burea~crat left with
no room to avoid a legislative directive is forced explicitly to con-
front his power to overrule such directives. The question remains,
however, what it was about the three Justices which Hruska chose
that raised the contrast between law as a reflection of what society
wants to be and law as words used to force society to adhere to what
sitting Justices regard as proper.
That the Hruska choices are inappropriate to raise this contrast, if
one judges on the basis of written opinions, is clearest in the case of
Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter is best remembered for his debate with
Hugo Black on the nature of the due process guarantee.
Frankfurter's position in that debate was an insistence that failure to
interpret constitutional words against the background of institutional
and historical factors ran the risk of reading personal moral
judgments into the constitutional text. Nor does Brandeis' view of
the proper work of the Court support the claim implicit in Hruska's
statement that the Warren Court was ignoring plain meanings of the
law that would be apparent to the 'mediocre. What Brandeis argued,
and what the Brandeis brief was used to demonstrate, was that New
Deal social engineering, once it had been authorized by legislative
directives, was sufficiently rational to permit the judiciary so to read
the Constitution as to authorize it.
--- What both Brandeis and Frankfurter appealed to, however, were
factors external to the dispute being litigated. Thus, Brandeis'
preference for sociological fact rather than deductive reasoning as the
context in terms of which one ascertained the meaning of legal
language eventuated in the famous sociological footnote in Brown v.
Board of Education.' Holmes' use of the striking vignette and
Black's reliance on the self-evident meaning of the word, on the
other hand, give the appearance of being inextricably a part of the
facts in dispute. The short of the matter is that, unlike either Black
5. 347 u.S. 483, 494 n.1l (1954).
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or Holmes, both Frankfurter and Brandeis were drawing support
from elements that could be perceived as separate and traditionally
nonauthoritative: factors different from or legally irrelevant to the
situations being judged.
The rationale for Hruska's choices can most profitably be ex-
amined in the case of Cardozo, who has been characterized as a
"master of judicial ambiguity."6 Cardozo served only briefly on the
Supreme Court, at the time when the federal government replaced
states as the political institution that regulated the national economy.
The constitutional provision relied on to prevent this transfer of
power was the tenth amendment. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 7
for example, it was argued that, because Title IX of the Social
Security ActS provided federal funds only where its provisions were
complied with, it "involv[ed] the coercion of the States in contraven-
tion of the tenth amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal
form of government."9 The argument was rejected. "[T]o hold that
motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion," the Court held, "is
to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doc-
trine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which
choice becomes impossible."lo
As Cardozo, whose opinion it was, hastened to note, however,
disposition of the controversy was unaffected by the fact that the law
did not in all circumstances "[assume] the freedom of the will as a
working hypothesis." 11 "We do not fix the outermost line. Enough
for present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is
within it. Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the
future. "12 This justification for upholding New Deal congressional
action against constitutional objection, since it deprives the legislative
line of the clarity with which Holmes endowed it, could indeed be
characterized as a decision importing ambiguity into the law. A body
of law that punishes fraudulent inducement, however, must necessarily
recognize that circumstances can exist where "temptation is
equivalent to coercion." 13 The question becomes, therefore, whether
what is ambiguous is the purpose served by the Justice's reading of
the law or the nature of law itself.
In technical legal terms, Cardozo is doing no more than recogniz-
ing that because no single decision can take into account all situa-
tions in which a given legal principle might arguably be applicable,
6. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF-CONTRACT 57-(1974).
7. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
8. 49 Stat. 639 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1108 (1976».
9. 301 U.S. at 585.
10. [d. at 589-90.
11. [d. at 590.
12. [d. at 591.
13. [d. at 590.
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the precedential effect of any given opinion is necessarily limited. The
act of recognition may itself have consequences, however, even when
what is recognized is true. Thus, United States Trust Co. v. New
JerseY,I4 involved a trial court's holding that state statutes repealing a
prior statutory covenant applicable to certain bonds constituted a
reasonable exercise of New Jersey's police power rather than a viola-
tion of the constitutional contract clause. The New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed per curiam, IS and the United States Supreme Court
reversed in an opinion condemned by the dissent for "substantially
distort[ing] modern constitutional jurisprudence governing regulation
of private economic interests."16 What the majority held was that
"[t]he trial court's 'total destruction' test is based on what we think
is a misreading of W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56
(1935)."17
The dissent responded:
The Court, as I read today's opinion, does not hold that the
trial court erred in its application of the facts of this case to Mr.
Justice Cardozo's [total destruction] formulation. Instead, it
manages to take refuge in the fact that Kavanaugh left open the
possibility that the test it enunciated may merely represent the
"'outermost limits'" of state authority.... This, I submit, is a
slender thread upon which to hang a belated revival of the Contract
Clause some 40 years later. 18
To repeat, it is of course a self-evident legal truth that there are
"outmost limits" to the applicability of any given legal precedent.
The problem is that knowledge of this limitation is no longer
restricted to legal circles. Once nonlawyers become aware of judicial
law as a creative source rather than a guarantor or protector of pre-
existing legislated rights, the response is to attempt to expand the ap-
plicability of favorable principles precisely to their "outmost limits."
One example of such behavior is the planned campaign of litigation
that led to Brown v. Board of Education,19 but it is important to
remember that much New Deal legislation promulgated new sets of
economic rights (e.g., the Wagner AcPO guaranteed the right to strike
and the Securities .and Exchange Act21 the right of access to cor-
porate information).
The statutory provision incorporating the right of access to cor-
porate information was the Securities and Exchange Act's section
14. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
15. 353 A.2d 514 (N.J. 1976).
16. 431 U.S. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. [d. at 26.
18. [d. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
22. [d. § 78j(b).
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lO(b),22 but judicial interpretation was required to establish that the
right it afforded could be enforced in a private action by the person
who was defrauded as well as by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Section 16(b),23 on the other hand, explicitly listed positions
in companies whose securities were traded, and provided that persons
occupying those positions could not retain profits realized within six
months from purchases and sales of the securities of that company.
In Blau v. Lehman,23 Justice Black held that section 16(b) did not
apply to securities trading by a partnership in the investment banking
and stock brokerage business, despite the fact that one of the part-
ners served in one of the listed positions (director) in the company on
whose securities a profit had been realized.
Justice Black rested his holding on the fact that the words of sec-
tion 16(b) did not explicitly include partnerships, and that lower
court precedents addressing this issue all supported his view. Justice
Douglas dissented on the basis that Hugo Black had misperceived the
nature of the dispute being adjudicated. B Douglas, formerly head of
the SEC, knew from experience that a refusal by the judiciary to
make rules on the peripheries of legislation would lead to the
substitution of administrative fiat for judicial discretion.
"At the root of the present problem," argued Justice Douglas,
"are the scope and degree of liability arising out of fiduciary relations.
In modern times that liability has been strictly construed. The New
York Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge Cardozo in
Meinhard v. Salmon, held a joint adventurer to a higher standard
than we insist upon today." Douglas quoted -that opinion:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.... Only thus has
the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than
that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court. "26
The words quoted are to a remarkable degree today's law of corpora-
tions, in that they are regularly cited as the standard applicable to
those owing fiduciary duties in connection with a given corporate ac-
tivity.
23. [d. § 78p(b).
24. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
25. [d. at 419-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. [d. at 416-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In 1902 Walter J. Salmon leased the Hotel Bristol for a twenty
year term, and, in order to finance the improvements he had agreed
to make, entered into an arrangement with a friend whereby he was
to manage the venture while Meinhard, the friend, .was to supply the
capital. The profits were to be diviOed on a sixty/forty basis for the
initial five years and then equally, and all losses were to be shared
equally. After initially faltering, the venture produced a rich return.
In 1921, four months before the lease was to expire, the reversioner,
Elbridge T. Gerry, approached Salmon with a development scheme
that included the Hotel site, and Salmon, without telling Meinhard,
established a realty company tht got a new lease when the original one
expired. The Appellate Division increased to one-half the quarter
share awarded to Meinhard by a referee. Thus it came before Car-
dozo as a judge on the New York Court of Appeals. 27
Many of the opinions written by Cardozo while on that bench
have become legal classics, for Cardozo's writing embodied a genius
for shaping the common law, and his style was a tool in this creative
process. In May 1928, for example, Chief Judge Cardozo handed
down his classic opinion in Po/sgroi v. Long Is/and R.R. 28 which oc-
cupied a scant five columns in the reporter.
In August 1924. Helen Palsgraf, a cleaning lady from Brooklyn,
decided to take her children to the beach at Rockaway. Like
thousands of others, they used the Long Island Railroad to get to
Rockaway Beach. While standing on the platform in close proximity
to some mail scales, she mayor may not have noticed a commotion
at the other end of the platform, resulting from a man who was run-
ning to catch an already departing train being pushed onto that train
by two Long Island Railroad trainmen. While that was occurring, the
brown paper parcel he was carrying fell. Inside that package,
unknown to the trainmen, were firecrackers which exploded on im-
pact. The shock dislodged the scales, which struck Helen Palsgraf. As
a result, Helen Palsgraf developed a stutter.
. Helen Palsgraf was poor. She earned about $400 per year. The
doctor's treatments were costly. The railroad was rich. She sued. At
trial, she recovered $6,000. The railroad, no stranger to such ac-
cidents, appealed the decision. 29
Cardozo speaks the speech magisterial in Po/sgroi. The language
is lean and hard. There is no ornament, only bone and tissue. The
style is severe. So is the decision. To have negligence, one must have
duty. On that hot summer's day in 1924, those trainmen owed no
duty to Helen Palsgraf. Their negligence to the gentleman boarding
the train was not the cause of her injury. The injury to her-and the
27. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
28. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
29. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111-151 (1976).
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opinion never disputes that Helen Palsgraf was injured-must be un-
compensated, for "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation . . . .30
Reversal must have meant a great deal to Mrs. Palsgraf. Six
thousand dollars of her money was being taken away. She was in
debt to her doctor and to her lawyer. And, to add insult to injury,
Cardozo awarded costs equal to nearly her full year's earnings to the
Long Island Railroad. Not only did the innocent party go uncoinpen-
sated, but she was penalized for bringing suit. Cardozo enunciated a
principle and ruined a person.
Professor John Noonan, in his Holmes Lectures for 1972,31
treated the Palsgraj opinion as a model of judicial blindness, a
sacrifice of an innocent victim at the altar of legal principle. Car-
dozo, according to Noonan, is manipulating the style magisterial,
eliminating all that can be eliminated so· as to leave only "The
Rule." It is, in short, an opinion that is written for the commen-
tators, for neat characterization and simplistic categorization.
Almost seven months to the day after Cardozo handed down his
opinion in Palsgral, he again made legal history, this time in
Meinhard v. Salmon. The style and rhetoric .of Meinhard is, at times,
nothing less than chivalric. Meinhard and Salmon were "co-
adventurers"32 and "comrade[s],"33 each to share "fair weather and
... foul" and "for -better or for worse."34 Each owed. to the other
the "finest"3' and "undivided"36 loyalty. The crux of the decision,
the most often quoted passages, are even more rhetorical and florid:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties.... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is . . . the standard of behavior. . . . Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court. 37 .
In 1929 Justice Holmes wrote of Cardozo to John C. H. Wu:
"[I] have noticed such a sensitive delicacy in him that I should trem-
ble lest I should prove unworthy of his regard.... I believe he
is a great and beautiful spirit. "38 And yet Cardozo wrote Palsgral.
30. 162 N.E. at 100 (emphasis added).
31. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111-151 (1976).
32. 164 N.E. at 546.
33. [d. at 547.




38. Letter from Beverly Farms, Mass., (July I, 1929) in JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BoOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS WI
(H. Schriver ed. 1936).
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Pa/sgral is a magisterial opinion. It opens on a stentorian note:
"Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad after
buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. "39 Not once in that opin-
ion does Cardozo write "Helen Palsgraf" or "Palsgraf." Always it
is, "plaintiff" or "she." The parties are nameless and faceless; they
exist only as the basis for expounding "The Rule." The law is speak-
ing through its minister.
The lean hardness of the magisterial style has bowed in Meinhard
to the rhetoric of personal feeling. Cardozo defined the magisterial
style:
It eschews ornament. It is meager in illustration and analogy.
If it argues, it does so with the downward rush and overwhelming
conviction of the syllogism, seldom with tentative gropings towards
the inductive apprehension of a truth imperfectly discerned. We
hear the voice of the law speaking by its consecrated ministers with
the calmness and assurance that are born of a sense of mastery and
power. 40
And that style is not Meinhard.
Meinhard begins: "On April 10, 1902, Louisa M. Gerry leased to
the defendant Walter J. Salmon the premises known as the Hotel
Bristol . . . ."4. Throughout the opinion the parties are called by
name; Salmon is Salmon and Meinhard is Meinhard. The parties
have names and personalities. They are real. The rule is relational.
The judge is speaking.
Cardozo was a conscious stylist. Both cases presented the same
question: had there existed a duty and had that duty been breached?
In Pa/sgral a faceless woman was ruined. In Meinhard a rich man
was made richer.
The decisions reveal the intersection of judicial style and
substance. Pa/sgral was a transaction in the workaday world, in the
marketplace. There, the "morals of the marketplace," of the
"crowd," rule; and the crowd, of course, is faceless.
Meinhard was something else, something apart from the worka-
day world. Two men became coadventurers and comrades. They
were bound one to the other, and this relationship was something
apart from the marketplal.:e in which it was formed. The style
magisterial, as a result, lost its sparseness, and oracle of the law
through whom the law spoke gave way to someone else. The
criterion invoked was never explicitly stated, but the style said it all.
39. 162 N.E. at 99. This is a style Cardozo used frequently; c/. Berkey v.
Third' Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 59 (N.Y. 1926): "The plaintiff boarded a street care at
Fort Lee Ferry ...."; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y.
1916): "The defendant is a manufacturer of automobiles."
40. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 THE YALE REVIEW, 699, 703 (1925).
41. 164 N.E. at 545.
HeinOnline -- 25 St. Louis U. L.J. 95 1981-1982
1981] THE MEANING OF PRECEDENT 95
In Meinhard the persons forced Cardozo to forget the context; in
Pa/sgral the context obliterated the persons.
The three Justices cited by Hruska, although having attained
eleyation to the Supreme Court, were aware of themselves as out--
sjders in the society which charged them with the task of being
judges. Brandeis was a reformed Boston lawyer who grew rich defend-
ant labor; Frankfurter, a Harvard Law School professor who
devoted considerable time while on the Supreme Court to staffing the
New Deal bureaucracy; and Cardozo, the son of a New York trial
judge involved in struggles among nineteenth century railroad en-
trepreneurs who obtained judicial injunctions through bribery. 42
Brandeis, Frankfurter, Cardozo, the justices cited by Hruska, were
Jews-members of a religious minority who held official positions.
Even in non-theocratic societies like the United States, such persons
remain outsiders to the extent that the society served by their posi-
tions defines itself in terms of religious symbols. 43
An awareness of being "outside" the society in which one lives'
that enables one to perceive the restraints of social convention, of
social convention being binding only in a formal sense, often makes
innovation easier. Such innovations, however, function to loosen the
conventional ties that bind society. 44
Barnes v. Andrews4 ' involved a bill of equity attempting to hold
a director liable on a theory of "general inattention to his duties as a
director. "46 Judge Learned Hand, while concluding that "I cannot ac-
quit Andrews of misprision in his office, "47 declined to hold the
defendant liable because "I pressed [counsel] to show me a case in
which the courts have held that a director could be charged generally
with the collapse of a business in respect of which he had been inatten-
tive, and I am not aware that he has found one. "48 This refusal to assess
liability because of the lack of the prior adjudication of a similar fact
pattern clearly constitutes treatment of Andrews by Hand more fair
than that accorded Salmon by Judge Cardozo. Even apart from the
questions raised by Meinhard's claims to fairness, however, it must be
remembered that Judge Hand's holding will itself constitute a prece-
dent that general inattention does not violate legal standards.
In a society that minimizes the impact of administrative fiat, legal
standards must necessarily be incorporated in judicial decisions, and
those decisions are useful as precedent only if applicable to new fact
42. C. ADAMS & H. ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE (1871).
43. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
44. The term is taken from P. GAY, WEIMER CULTURE: THE OUTSIDER AS IN-
SIDER (1968).
45. 298 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
46. [d. at 615.
47. [d. at 616.
48. [d.
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situations. Since Hand did not regard Andrews' conduct in office as .
adequate, it is fair to assume he would characterize his pre<;edent as .
unfortunate. It is, therefore, left unclear whether Barnes or Meinhard is
better law, as it is left unclear whether we require the oversimplifica-
tions inherent in either graphic images or ideals "stricter than the
morals of the marketplace."
What is clear is that both Holmes and Cardozo sat as Justices of
the Supreme Court; Judge Learned Hand did not.
